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THE HIGH PRICE OF POVERTY IN
ARKANSAS’S COURTS: RETHINKING THE
UTILITY OF MUNICIPAL FINES AND FEES
Madison Miller*
I. INTRODUCTION
The opposite of poverty is not wealth. It is justice.
— Bryan Stevenson, Esq.1
Beginning in the 1980s, a “trail of tax cuts” led to budget
shortfalls and revenue gaps throughout the United States.2 These
budgetary problems resulted in many cities and towns shifting
their burden of funding courts and the justice system at large “to
the ‘users’ of the courts, including those least equipped to pay.”3
Although “jailing an indigent person for a fine-only, low-level
offense is unconstitutional,” it is still an ongoing practice in many
states, including Arkansas.4 In 1995, Arkansas passed new
legislation to govern its circuit courts’ collection and enforcement
of fines and fees.5 One subsection of this chapter explicitly
provides that the “court shall inquire into the defendant’s ability
to pay and shall make a determination of the defendant’s financial
* J.D. Candidate, The University of Arkansas School of Law, 2022. Arkansas Law
Notes Editor for the Arkansas Law Review, 2021-2022. The author thanks Associate Dean
Tiffany Murphy of the University of Arkansas School of Law for her guidance and advice
in writing this Comment. The author also thanks David Sachar for his invaluable insight into
Arkansas’s Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission. The author thanks the Criminal
Justice Project at the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights for its unrelenting efforts to
remedy this injustice and for igniting her passion for this cause. The author would also like
to thank her family for their lifelong support in her educational endeavors, and Tyler for his
unwavering encouragement and support.
1. PETER EDELMAN, NOT A CRIME TO BE POOR: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY
IN AMERICA xix (2017) (emphasis added).
2. Id. at xv.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 4.
5. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-13-701 to 712 (1995).

4 MILLER.MAN.FIN. COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

12/13/21 2:50 PM

548

Vol. 74:3

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

ability to pay the fine.”6 Although this procedural safety net is
embedded in the statute, it has not served its intended purpose for
several reasons.
A large part of the problem stems from courts’ partial or, in
many cases, complete neglect of this mandated analysis.7 One
contributing factor is that “the statute does not enumerate types of
information to be considered before making an ability to pay
determination.”8 Therefore, many judges fail to conduct a truly
meaningful analysis when determining an individual’s realistic
ability to pay. In Arkansas, the law mandates an inquiry into
whether the person can show that his or her failure to pay was not
“purposeful” or a result of a lack of “good-faith effort” before
imposing jail time.9 However, in practice, “the entire inquiry
[may] rest[] on a judge’s observations of whether defendants
possess random items, such as cigarettes, smart phones, or brand
name clothing.”10 There are endless examples of people whose
struggles illuminate the real-world effects of these arbitrary
determinations.
Kimberly Snodgrass, a named plaintiff in Mahoney v.
Derrick,11 was convicted for failure to pay ten separate times over
four years because she could not afford the monthly payments the
judge imposed.12 However, the presiding judge did not conduct
the requisite evaluation of Kimberly’s ability to pay, as is required
by Arkansas law,13 even though “[a]ll but one of her jail records
indicate[d] she was unemployed at the time of arrest.”14 Upon
each conviction, she endured up to thirty days in jail, as well as
6. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-702(5)(A) (emphasis added).
7. MYESHA BRADEN ET AL., LAWS.’ COMM. FOR CIV. RTS UNDER L., TOO POOR TO
PAY: HOW ARKANSAS’S OFFENDER-FUNDED JUSTICE SYSTEM DRIVES POVERTY & MASS
INCARCERATION 9 (2019), [https://perma.cc/AU7R-C2E9].
8. Id. at 10.
9. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-703.
10. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 16.
11. See generally Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial at 2, 12-13,
Mahoney v. Derrick, No. 60CV-18-5616 (Aug. 9, 2018). Mahoney v. Derrick is a class
action lawsuit that was filed against a White County District Court Judge in an effort to put
an end to his unlawful behavior in his assessment of fines and fees. See infra text
accompanying notes 82-89.
12. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 16.
13. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-702(5)(A) (1995).
14. Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, at 28.

4 MILLER.MAN.FIN. COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

RETHINKING MUNICIPAL FINES

12/13/21 2:50 PM

549

additional charges between $450.00 and $670.00 tacked onto her
existing outstanding debt.15 Aside from added charges, each
payment made towards an outstanding debt’s principal balance
has a portion deducted as an administrative interest fee.16 As a
result of her repeated incarceration and mounting debt, Kimberly
“lost two jobs, her driver’s license has been suspended multiple
times, and she has lost housing four times; each time losing much
of what she and her children owned.”17
Tragically, Kimberly’s story is not unique. Tina Phares, then
a forty-seven-year-old mother and former accounts manager with
an associate degree, had a similarly disastrous experience with the
Arkansas courts.18 Tina’s story began when she turned to drugs
after a series of personal tragedies, including the deaths of her
father and toddler son, an accident that left her husband
“hospitalized [and] in an induced coma for a year,” and a
tumultuous divorce.19 Over the subsequent years, before entering
a treatment program in 2017, she was “convicted of failure to pay
nine times and sentenced to 30 days in jail seven times.”20 At one
point, the judge issued an arrest warrant for failure to pay “less
than [a] month after she was released on two consecutive 30-day[]
sentences for convictions of failure to pay[,]”21 allowing her
almost no time to get back on her feet and earn an income.
While Tina has made personal strides, such as becoming
drug-free and, in 2018, “bringing home her first paycheck since
her son died[,]” her life and personal progress remain stagnated
by the over $15,000 in debt she owes to the court.22 Like in
Kimberly’s case, there was no inquiry conducted to determine
Tina’s ability to pay the fines and fees levied against her.23 Had
15. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 16 (explaining that, on average, Kimberly has
spent “one of every three days in the White County Detention Center” since the time of her
first arrest in September 2014).
16. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-704(b)(1)(A) (2017).
17. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 16.
18. Personal Narrative: Tina Marie, FINES & FEES JUST. CTR. (Aug. 9, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/2TRR-HWXS].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, at 20.
22. Personal Narrative: Tina Marie, supra note 18.
23. Id.
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the proper examination been performed, the judge likely would
have recognized the personal hardships, battle with addiction, and
lack of employment and financial resources that impeded Tina’s
ability to pay. Moreover, Tina might have never spent time in
jail, and she certainly would not have been burdened with
thousands of dollars in debt (totaling approximately $15,000 in
2018).24
Because of the unlawful actions of one judge, both Kimberly
and Tina were jailed on failure to pay warrants for more than 150
days over a three-to-four-year period, and both have incurred
additional debt of “between $4,000 and $5,000 in fines and costs
for the same charges.”25 These two first-hand accounts are drops
in the bucket of the endless stories of personal and financial ruin
brought on by the courts.26 Thousands of Arkansans remain
bogged down by outrageous mounting debt stemming from
flagrant disregard for the law and Arkansas’s Constitution.27
Many people have spent time in prison, lost jobs, missed
opportunities for personal and financial growth, and some have
even lost custody of their children because of their inability to
afford the debt imposed on them by Arkansas courts.28
While the initial response is oftentimes, “don’t do the crime
if you can’t do the time,” the goal of this Comment is to illustrate
how the issue is much more complex than a simple form of
appropriate retribution or punishment. Many people find
themselves in this treacherous cycle due to low-level civil
offenses, such as a single traffic ticket or a minor housing code
violation.29 These are not felony convictions; many times, these
are not even infractions that carry with them more than a fine,
much less jail time. The preamble to the United States
Constitution expressly references the goals of “establish[ing]
24. Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, at 10.
25. Id. at 28.
26. See generally NEIL SEALY ET AL., ARK. CMTY. INST., CAN’T WIN FOR LOSING:
HOW INSTITUTIONS & POLICIES KEEP ARKANSANS IN DEBT 11-12 (2019),
[https://perma.cc/PNA8-YUD7].
27. See generally id.
28. See, e.g., Personal Narrative: Nikita, FINES & FEES JUST. CTR. (Aug. 9, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/NS9T-7MH7].
29. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 6; see also SEALY ET AL., supra note 26, at 11-12.
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Justice, . . . promot[ing] the general Welfare, and secur[ing] the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”30 This
Comment will argue that until we remedy these grave injustices,
inflicted primarily upon low-income Arkansans, we are not living
up to these ideals.
While the issue is complex, the premise is simple. It is
wrong to jail poor people or add hundreds of dollars at a time to
the principal of their debt solely because they cannot afford to
pay, and it should not be happening in the State of Arkansas. The
Arkansas statutes and United States Supreme Court cases31 that
address this issue have not served their intended purpose of
safeguarding constitutional rights. Therefore, Arkansas should
make a concerted effort to end this unconstitutional practice that
is a waste of taxpayer dollars, with the cost of incarceration
typically exceeding the amount in dispute.32 The Arkansas
Legislature should address this urgent problem by adding
specificity to the existing statute in the form of factors a judge
must consider when making an ability-to-pay determination.
Additionally, community members and non-profit
organizations should continue pushing for reform through
litigation. To enact real change, there must be accountability.
Given the obstacle of judicial immunity in litigation, plaintiffs,
lawyers, and concerned citizens alike should utilize Arkansas’s
Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission (“JDDC”) to
report repeat-offender judges and ensure that unethical or
unlawful behavior does not go unpunished. Arkansas should
prioritize this effort and establish a uniform system to guarantee
equal protection under the law for its citizens and promote
confidence in its courts and the judiciary. Furthermore, many
individuals facing unlawful treatment do not have the time,
connections, or resources to continue litigating a case for years
through proceedings and appeals. While courts can serve as an
30. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
31. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (holding that “[t]here can be no equal
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has”); see also
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
32. MATTHEW MENENDEZ ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE STEEP COSTS OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES AND FINES 5 (2019), [https://perma.cc/YE9N-AR3E].
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effective mechanism for plaintiffs, we should not accept the
notion that the existence of courts as an avenue for recourse
somehow negates the serious nature of judges flouting the law.
This Comment will proceed with four main parts. Part II
will provide background on the subject matter to furnish a
foundational understanding of the issue. Part III will explain how
the municipal fines and fees system functions in Arkansas. Part
IV will propose possible solutions and practical remedies that, if
utilized, could generate more positive outcomes for Arkansas’s
local and municipal governments and their citizens. Finally, Part
V concludes that making meaningful reforms in this area is both
morally and economically imperative.
II. BACKGROUND: THE “FINES AND FEES”
CONUNDRUM
For at least two decades, the new criminalization of poverty
crept into communities large and small, driven by misbegotten
law enforcement politics and the search for revenue, but with
little public attention.33
“A debtors’ prison is any prison, jail, or other detention
facility in which people are incarcerated for their inability,
refusal, or failure to pay debt.”34 The federal government
outlawed debtors’ prisons in 1833.35 However, it was not until a
series of cases between 1970 and 1983 that the Supreme Court
established the unconstitutionality of incarcerating people simply
because they cannot afford to pay fines and fees that the State has
levied upon them.36 The Court’s opinion in Bearden v. Georgia
33. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at xviii.
34. Eli Hager, Debtors’ Prisons, Then and Now: FAQ, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb.
24, 2015, 7:15 AM), [https://perma.cc/X7N3-3KMY].
35. Id.
36. See Williams, 399 U.S. at 235, 240-41 (establishing that the Equal Protection
Clause is violated when a defendant is imprisoned for an amount of time exceeding the
statutory maximum on the basis of an inability to pay a fine or court costs); Tate, 401 U.S.
at 397 (opining that the Equal Protection Clause is violated when a crime is punishable only
by fine for those who can afford to pay it, but by prison for those who cannot); Bearden, 461
U.S. at 668 (holding that incarcerating an indigent defendant for failure to pay a fine violates
the Equal Protection Clause unless the defendant has the financial means to pay, and thus,
nonpayment is willful).
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was, and remains, arguably the most consequential case on this
issue.37 Although Bearden established that courts must conduct
an analysis into a defendant’s ability to pay and must not imprison
him or her for failure to pay unless the failure was willful, the
opinion did not give explicit instruction regarding what exactly
the Court meant by “willfully refused to pay.”38
Because of this lack of clarity, municipal judges frequently
ignore state law and the standard set forth by the Supreme Court
in Bearden.39 One consequence of this initial failure to conduct a
meaningful analysis of an individual’s ability to pay is that, in
many cases, the individual is then placed on a payment plan with
the court that he or she may not be able to keep up with. As a
result, if an individual defaults on their payment plan and the
judge issues a bench warrant for his or her arrest, “Bearden
becomes irrelevant”40 because the individual’s failure to pay
“constitutes criminal contempt, which allows incarceration as
well as further fines and fees.”41 Once a person commits a “crime
that allows jailing,” such as contempt, “there is no protection for
indigence.”42 In turn, this creates a loophole that results in
punishing people for their inability to pay.43
The truth is, while they are not referred to as “debtors’
prisons” by name, local jails across the country are full of people
incarcerated based upon their inability to pay fines and fees.44
The American Action Forum estimates that roughly “10 million
37. See generally EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 4-5.
38. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668; EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 5.
39. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 5.
40. Id. at 6.
41. Id. at 5.
42. Id. at 6.
43. Cf. Cortney E. Lollar, Eliminating the Criminal Debt Exception for Debtors’
Prisons, 98 N.C. L. REV. 427, 434 (2020) (stating that while “[a] person who is incarcerated
because she does not have the ability to pay a [] legal [financial] obligation might well be
deterred from engaging in any further criminal activity, but when the failure to pay in and of
itself becomes criminal activity justifying further incarceration, the deterrence value is
difficult to ascertain”).
44. Tara O’Neill Hayes & Margaret Barnhorst, Incarceration and Poverty in the
United States, AM. ACTION F. (June 30, 2020), [https://perma.cc/97HP-MDYF]; see also
Lollar, supra note 43, at 434-35 (arguing that “courts and legislators should eliminate
incarceration for the nonpayment of” legal financial obligations because “[s]ufficient
mechanisms are already in place for those who have assets but choose not to disgorge
them[,]” such as property seizure and wage garnishment).
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people owe $50 billion in legal fees, fines, and penalties” in the
United States.45 Despite their legal obligation to do so, “many
courts refuse to consider a person’s financial condition” when
imposing fines and fees and “at times[,] reject attempts to explain
dire financial circumstances such as homelessness, the needs of
dependent children, and the like by explicitly stating that [courtimposed] debt must take priority over such concerns.”46
While fines, imposed at the time of conviction, are intended
to serve the dual purposes of punishment and deterrence, fees, on
the contrary, “are intended to raise revenue” and often “bear no
relation to the offense committed.”47 Arkansas’s Constitution
specifically states that “[n]o person shall be imprisoned for debt
in any civil action . . . unless in cases of fraud.”48 Additionally, if
a “defendant claims an inability to pay [a] fine, the court shall
inquire into the defendant’s ability to pay and shall make a
determination of the defendant’s financial ability to pay the
fine.”49 If an individual elects to pay a fine in installments, there
is an added fee (essentially an interest charge) deducted from his
or her payment each month.50 These additional fees prolong the
amount of time it takes to pay off the debt, allowing the
municipality to rake in extra revenue and profit at the expense of
its community’s most vulnerable members.
Further, a missed payment can wreak havoc on a person’s
life in endless ways. Some judges in Arkansas will revoke the
person’s driver’s license and registration as punishment, despite
not having the authority to do so.51 This unlawful yet pervasive
45. Hayes & Barnhorst, supra note 44 (adding that roughly 5,000 people in the United
States are incarcerated because they are unable to afford release).
46. Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtors’
Prison, 65 UCLA L. REV. 2, 59 (2018) (detailing the account of one father of four who has
had to prioritize paying court debt over paying his electricity bill, buying his child a winter
coat, and providing food and shelter for his family, lamenting that “[i]t doesn’t matter what
[his] family suffers, so long as the court gets paid”).
47. MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 6.
48. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 16.
49. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-702(a)(5)(A) (1995) (emphasis added).
50. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-704(b)(1)(A) (2017).
51. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-402 (2021) (granting the Department of Finance and
Administration’s Office of Driver Services complete authority over administering laws
pertaining to suspension and revocation of driver’s licenses); BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7,
at 2.
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practice is counterproductive, as many people, particularly those
in rural areas of Arkansas, do not have adequate access to public
transportation.52 The lack of access to transportation coupled
with a suspended license may cause a person to lose their job,
further hindering their ability to pay off their debt.53
While non-profits like the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law (“Lawyers’ Committee”) and the American
Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) have made litigating these “fines
and fees” cases a priority, another available avenue of recourse is
reporting repeat-offender judges to the Judicial Discipline and
Disability Commission in Arkansas (“JDDC”).54 Arkansans
adopted a constitutional amendment establishing this commission
in November 1988,55 which “investigates and may take
disciplinary action or, in the most serious cases, recommend to
the Arkansas Supreme Court that it impose discipline upon a
judge whose actions are found to be a violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.”56
There are several possible disciplinary remedies that the
Commission may recommend. However, in the most serious
cases, “the [Arkansas] Supreme Court has the power to suspend,
remove or involuntarily retire or censure judges based on the
Commission’s recommendation.”57 In less serious cases, the
Commission acts independently to mandate professional
counseling and issue public admonishments, reprimands, or
censures to judges who have violated the Code of Judicial
Conduct.58 This process is worthwhile because it puts the judge
on notice of his or her misconduct. Additionally, as public record,
52. Rayla Bellis, More Than One Million Households Without a Car in Rural America
Need Better Transit, T4AMERICA BLOG (May 15, 2020), [https://perma.cc/X33T-KNF3];
BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 2.
53. See BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 2.
54. See Press Release, Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm’n, Letter of
Admonishment (Mar. 21, 2014), [https://perma.cc/SX78-MJ3F] (publicly admonishing
District Court Judge Keith Blackman of Craighead County for his practice of exacting illegal
fees on certain defendants “for changing a plea from ‘not guilty’ to ‘guilty[,]’” and formally
putting Judge Blackman on notice that this practice was unlawful).
55. See ARK. CONST. amend. 66.
56. About the Commission, JUD. DISCIPLINE & DISABILITY COMM’N,
[https://perma.cc/3G3Q-7WAH] (last visited Jan. 23, 2021).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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it may deter other judges from similar actions, resulting in
increased judicial accountability and incentivizing judges to
adhere to Arkansas’s laws and Constitution.
Making these reforms would most certainly benefit indigent
Arkansans, but the State’s population as a whole would reap
positive benefits as well. A 2020 study conducted by the Center
for American Progress found that 16.2% of Arkansans live in
poverty, with African Americans accounting for the largest
percentage of that group at 27.1%.59 This indicator ranks
Arkansas at 47th out of the 50 states and the District of Columbia
in overall poverty.60
The criminal justice system greatly depletes Arkansans’ tax
dollars. Arkansas has seventy-five counties, each with a county
jail.61 In 2018, Arkansas’s incarceration rate was 589 per 100,000
residents, far surpassing 2018’s national average of 374 per
100,000 residents.62 Over the last forty years, Arkansas’s prison
population has continued to increase steadily, skyrocketing from
2,911 in 1980, to 11,851 in 2000, to 17,713 in 2019.63 These
numbers do not even include the jail population in Arkansas’s
county jails, totaling 8,610 in 2013.64 Sebastian County, the
fourth largest county in Arkansas, proposed a county budget for
the year 2020 with the jail budget listed at $6,774,888, “a 5.8%
increase from the total jail budget from 2019[,]” consuming a
quarter of the proposed general fund budget, “making the jail the
highest-funded department in the general fund.”65
According to the Brennan Center for Justice, “almost every
state has increased criminal and civil court fees or added new

59. Arkansas 2020, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, [https://perma.cc/C2UC-EX85] (last
visited Apr. 6, 2021).
60. Overall Poverty 2020, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, [https://perma.cc/Z57Z-9WJG]
(last visited Apr. 6, 2021).
61. Arkansas 2018, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., [https://perma.cc/GXU2-J9P6] (last visited
Apr. 6, 2021).
62. Id.; 2018 National Averages, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., [https://perma.cc/38QJB6UF] (last visited Sept. 10, 2021).
63. State-by-State Data: Prison Population Over Time, SENT’G PROJECT,
[https://perma.cc/8D2J-YRV3] (last visited Jan. 29, 2021).
64. Id.
65. Thomas Saccente, Proposed ‘20 budget for Arkansas Jail Grows, ARK. ONLINE
(Oct. 20, 2019), [https://perma.cc/PJJ3-6JB9].
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ones” since 2008 as a way to increase revenue.66 However, the
Brennan Center’s report explains in detail just how inefficient this
practice is. For instance, the report points out that not only does
jailing people who are unable to pay the fines and fees imposed
on them fail to generate revenue, but it also comes at a high cost,
“sometimes as much as 115 percent” more than the outstanding
amount.67 The imposition of fines and court costs provides more
than 20% of the revenue for “nearly half of local governments.”68
Every state in the nation is squandering money it could invest in
infrastructure, better public schools, and improved public
health.69 Instead, it is invested in jailing individuals for low-level
offenses, including failure to pay court fines and fees.70 Worse
yet, jailing an individual only further handicaps their ability to
pay their legal financial obligations, and therefore, is a lose-lose
situation for all parties involved.
III. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY IN
ARKANSAS
There are a variety of scenarios around the country, but they
all add up to the same thing: prosecuting people for low-level
offenses, squeezing them for money, and jailing them if they miss
payments, in a cruel game of “pay or stay.”71
Because the United States Supreme Court has ruled that
jailing an indigent individual for failure to pay is
66. MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 6.
67. Id. at 5 (additionally, the report points out that the actual costs are even higher than
the estimated amounts because many of the costs associated with the debt collection are
unascertainable).
68. Hayes & Barnhorst, supra note 44.
69. See MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 5, 9; Christopher Ingram, The States That
Spend More Money on Prisoners Than College Students, WASH. POST (July 7, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/99CD-M7KX].
70. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 9; see also
Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Following the Money of Mass Incarceration, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 25, 2017), [https://perma.cc/KD5K-QB96]; see generally Terry-Ann
Craigie et al., Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings: How Involvement with the
Criminal Justice System Deepens Inequality, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 15, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/7N2R-NBT3].
71. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 9.
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unconstitutional,72 upholding this ruling should be relatively
simple. However, Bearden’s language that a failure to pay must
be “willful” for incarceration to be an appropriate remedy73 has
left lower courts with too much discretion in determining what
exactly “willful” means. In 2009, the Arkansas Court of Appeals
clearly stated that when a defendant violates the terms of their
sentence in the form of a failure to pay, “the State has the burden
of proving that the failure to pay restitution was inexcusable.”74
However, once the State presents that evidence, “the defendant
has the burden of presenting some reasonable excuse for his
failure to pay.”75
In Jordan v. State, the Supreme Court of Arkansas stated that
“[a] defendant’s failure to make bona fide efforts to seek
employment or to borrow money to pay restitution may justify
imprisonment.”76 While seeking employment seems reasonable,
the suggestion that someone may go to jail because they have not
made “bona fide efforts” to borrow money from people in their
life is not reasonable and is entirely too subjective. Additionally,
borrowing money would place the person in the same position of
owing money to someone or something—keeping them indebted.
Arkansas law mandates that in determining the method of
payment of restitution, the court take into account:
(A) The financial resources of the defendant and the burden
that payment of restitution will impose with regard to
another obligation of the defendant;
(B) The ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an
installment basis or on another condition to be fixed by the
court; and
(C) The rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment
of restitution and the method of payment.77

While this may sound like “the bases are covered,” what is
happening in practice is an entirely different story.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 667-68 (1983).
Id. at 668.
Beebe v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 113, at 2, 303 S.W.3d 89, 90.
Id.
327 Ark. 117, 122, 939 S.W.2d 255, 257 (1997).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-205(e)(2)(A)-(C) (2015).
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One would be hard-pressed to find a better example of this
statute’s inefficacy than the courtroom of one White County
District Judge.78 During his 2016 campaign, the judge was quoted
in the Searcy Daily Citizen admitting, “I know my fines are a lot
higher [than other judges] . . . I have a policy: Stay out of trouble
for four years . . . Make your monthly payments . . . If they can
do that for four years, they can do it for the rest of their lives.”79
Further, he proceeds by saying, “I try to hammer them at the front
end and make them want to change, then I give them incentive.”80
One of the many issues with this approach is that his selfproclaimed “zero tolerance” policy81 is outside of his purview as
a judge.
Court filings in Mahoney v. Derrick—the class action
lawsuit brought against the judge—further outline his behavior,
asserting that the judge “routinely sentences individuals
convicted of failure to pay to twice the length of jail time as those
convicted of the most serious misdemeanors under State law. He
does not credit the jail time against their debt; instead, the jail time
is in addition to new debt imposed.”82 The Complaint goes on to
allege not only that “[t]housands of individuals currently owe
debt in [the judge’s] courts[,]” but also that he has “jailed some
[individuals] while they live[d] in tents or shelters.”83
The judge confirmed in a deposition that he issues arrest
warrants and jails individuals who miss a single payment with no
pre-arrest determination of “whether that person failed to make
their fine payments knowingly and willfully.”84 Further, he
concedes to his failure to act in accordance with the Arkansas
Fines Collection Law, stating that he does not consider an
individual’s ability to pay at sentencing, and does not consider
78. See Alan Pyke, A Judge in Arkansas Makes $147,000 a Year for Turning Poor
People into Indentured Servants, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 9, 2018, 3:27 PM),
[https://perma.cc/6BB6-ZJZN].
79. Id.
80. Id. (it is unclear what exactly this “incentive” is).
81. Max Brantley, New Lawsuit on ‘Debtor Prison’ Practices in White County
UPDATE, ARK. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018), [https://perma.cc/4JBP-6TKZ].
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 3, Mahoney
v. Derrick, No. 73CV-18-874 (Aug. 3, 2020).
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“whether the $100 per month payment plan he imposes causes a
severe and undue hardship on that person or his or her
dependents.”85
Because of the position of trust and authority that judges
occupy in our society, the very least the public should expect them
to do is follow and uphold the law. One might think that when
such disregard for the law is exposed, the thousands of people
who have faced financial ruin as a result of the injustice would
have their debts forgiven, or at least receive some sort of
compensation. However, that is not the case. The Circuit Court
of White County granted summary judgment for the defendant
judge in Mahoney based on his entitlement to “absolute judicial
immunity.”86 The plaintiffs got nothing.87 However, even if the
court had ruled in their favor, the tens of thousands of dollars in
debt that they collectively owe to the judge’s courts would have
remained unsettled, and they would not have received any
compensation.88 Because the plaintiffs only sought declaratory
relief, a court order would have simply mandated that the judge
modify his actions to accord with Arkansas’s laws when imposing
and enforcing the collection of fines and fees.89
Such an outcome is a crushing blow to indigent people’s
quest for justice in Arkansas and across the country. When a
judge acknowledges under oath that he engages in practices that
violate state law, as well as numerous rulings set forth by the
United States Supreme Court with impunity, that should be
concerning. The egregious and ongoing nature of the judge’s
practices met with the outcome of this case leaves only one
conclusion: there must be a new route to recourse for indigent
Arkansans.

85. Id.
86. Order and Judgment at 4, Mahoney v. Derrick, No. 73CV-18-874 (Dec. 30, 2020).
87. Id.
88. This is because the plaintiffs were seeking declaratory relief, which “refers to a
court’s judgment stating the rights of parties without ordering any specific action or listing
awards for damages.”
Declaratory Relief, CORNELL L. SCH. (June 2020),
[https://perma.cc/Y9KQ-T8TV].
89. See id.
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In its 1998 opinion in Robinson v. Langdon,90 the Arkansas
Supreme Court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s test
for judicial immunity articulated in Cleavinger v. Saxner.91 This
test articulates six factors for consideration:
(1) the need to assure that the individual can perform his
functions without harassment or intimidation;
(2) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for
private damages actions as a means of controlling
unconstitutional conduct;
(3) insulation from political influence;
(4) the importance of precedent;
(5) the adversary nature of the process; and
(6) the correctability of error on appeal. 92

The Trial Handbook for Arkansas Lawyers further elaborates on
this concept, noting that “[t]his immunity applies even when a
judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly[,]” and that
“[t]he rationale . . . is not to protect or benefit malicious or corrupt
judges, but to benefit the public, whose interest it is that judges
should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence
and without fear of consequences.”93
While some of these justifications sound sensible when
assessed at face value, the rationale that failing to punish judicial
wrongdoing is somehow to the community’s benefit is an
argument that holds little weight when looking at an example like
the Mahoney case. First, a judge’s “errors” are not always errors
which an appeal could remedy.94 Second, when a judge is not
exactly “perform[ing] his functions”95 in an ethical way, instead
of protecting him as the hypothetical target of harassment or
intimidation, the courts should prioritize the public’s best interest.
Courts should not ignore the ways in which the judge violated his
90. 333 Ark. 662, 670, 970 S.W.2d 292, 296 (1998).
91. 474 U.S. 193, 202 (1985).
92. Robinson, 333 Ark. at 670, 970 S.W.2d at 296.
93. 3 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR ARKANSAS LAWYERS § 9:21
(2020-2021 ed.).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89; see also Declaratory Relief, supra note
88.
95. Robinson, 333 Ark. at 670, 970 S.W.2d at 296.
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oath of office and ultimately ensured members of his community
stayed intrenched in poverty for years.96
What started as a “zero-tolerance” policy ultimately resulted
in a pattern of unconstitutional failures to conduct inquiries into
individuals’ ability to pay, incarcerating many of those
individuals when they could not pay, and continuing to levy
additional fines and fees upon them for years.97 Many Arkansans
will never financially or emotionally recover from their
entanglement in this system, and granting the judge absolute
judicial immunity does not protect the interests of Arkansas’s
citizens.
Additionally, the plaintiffs in Mahoney were not seeking
monetary damages.98 Therefore, allowing the doctrine of judicial
immunity to bar the imposition of declaratory relief to stop
unlawful behavior—with no monetary damages at stake as a
possible remedy—seems rather ludicrous. While the argument
that the judicial immunity doctrine furthers the public interest
because “judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions
with independence and without fear of consequences”99 certainly
makes sense in some situations, this doctrine must be narrowed,
clarified, and reformed for its stated policy objectives to function
as intended.
Judicial immunity should not serve as a complete barrier to
justice for individuals treated in an antithetical way to that which
most Arkansans would deem ethical, appropriate, or deserving of
a position of power and respect. Furthermore, a doctrine created
to alleviate judges from “fear of consequences” might not serve
the public’s best interest.100 Instead, establishing a doctrine that
provides judges with reasonable protection from suit while still
preserving a strong mechanism for accountability and the
imposition of appropriate consequences would be more suitable.
Judges swear an oath to uphold our state laws and constitution,
96. See supra text accompanying notes 78-90.
97. See Matthew Martinez, Arkansas judge throws defendants ‘too poor to pay’ in
‘debtors’ prison,’ lawsuit says, Fort Worth Star Telegram (Aug. 10, 2018, 10:10 AM),
[https://perma.cc/9UWC-673Y].
98. Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, at 1.
99. 3 HALL, JR., supra note 93, § 9:21.
100. See id.
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and it is in the best interest of the public to ensure judges uphold
these oaths.
However, in November 2017, the ACLU of Arkansas and
the Lawyers’ Committee were successful in settling a lawsuit in
which the city of Sherwood, Pulaski County, and the district court
judge were the named defendants.101 This settlement mandated
that “Sherwood’s ‘hot check’ court [would] no longer jail people
who can’t afford to pay court fines and fees imposed for bouncing
a check . . . [and] requires the court to evaluate each defendant’s
ability to pay before determining the person’s sentence.”102
Several factors could point to why this outcome was so different.
The fact that the city and county were themselves named
defendants, and thus, were not entitled to judicial immunity, may
have provided a greater incentive to settle. Maybe it was because
this case was litigated in federal court as opposed to state court.103
However, the fact that the settlement had to include a mandate to
evaluate each individual’s ability to pay, which the law already
requires, further demonstrates the shirking of the law that is
occurring in some of Arkansas’s courtrooms.
IV. THE PATH TOWARD A MORE EQUITABLE
SYSTEM IN ARKANSAS
Ferguson was a spark that turned isolated instances of
activism into a national conversation and produced numerous

101. Dade v. City of Sherwood, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF ARK.,
[https://perma.cc/Q9AN-JMQE] (last visited Oct. 27, 2020).
102. Id.; see also Linda Satter, Under Deal, 1 Arkansas Court to Back Off Jailing Over
Hot Checks, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Nov. 15, 2017, 4:30 AM),
[https://perma.cc/8WBR-747M] (One plaintiff in the case “wrote a single bad check for
$28.93 in 2011 that, by the time the suit was filed [in 2016], had resulted in her being arrested
at least seven times, paying nearly $3,300 in fines, fees and court costs, and spending 25
days in jail . . . . [T]he lead plaintiff, Charles Dade, spent more than 100 days in jail and was
assessed about $4,000 in fines, fees and court costs because of six bounced checks totaling
$360 that he wrote in 2009.”).
103. See Complaint—Class Action at 6, Dade v. City of Sherwood, No. 4:16-CV00602-JM (E.D. Ark. Aug. 23, 2016), [https://perma.cc/68TN-WKLV] (bringing “civil
rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., and the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution”).
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examples of partnerships between advocates and decisionmakers.104
In 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) released the
findings from its investigation of the Police Department in
Ferguson, Missouri, highlighting the fact that “Ferguson law
enforcement efforts are focused on generating revenue.”105 As a
result, many states and localities began to face pressure to
reevaluate the use of fines and fees to generate revenue.106 While
there are many meritorious ideas regarding the most effective
ways to achieve reform, this section will focus on three practical
suggestions to make strides towards a more just and equitable
system in Arkansas.
A. Utilizing the Arkansas JDDC to Punish Judicial
Misconduct
The American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued a
formal opinion regarding the “[e]thical obligations of judges in
collecting legal financial obligations and other debts,”107
following the DOJ’s groundbreaking report detailing law
enforcement’s unlawful practices in Ferguson, Missouri.108 The
nexus between the ABA’s opinion and the DOJ’s report is that
they both address unlawful practices of government and law
enforcement officials in their focus on generating revenue.
The ABA opinion asserts that to comply with the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct, judges must “undertake a meaningful
inquiry into a litigant’s ability to pay court fines, fees, restitution,
104. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 10.
105. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT 9 (2015) (quote in all capitals in the original).
106. See Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, FINES & FEES JUST. CTR.
(Mar. 1, 2015), [https://perma.cc/K9HM-PJ4Y] (asserting that “[t]he publication of the
Ferguson report is widely viewed as the start of the movement to reform fines and fees in the
U.S.”).
107. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 490 (2020) (quote in all capitals
in the original) (discussing the Model Code of Judicial Conduct’s clear mandate for
meaningful inquiry into a defendant’s ability to pay before incarcerating a defendant for
failing to pay).
108. See id. at 2.
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other charges, bail, or civil debt before using incarceration as
punishment for failure to pay, as inducement to pay or appear, or
as a method of purging a financial obligation whenever state or
federal law so provides.”109 According to the ABA, Rules 1.1,
1.2, 2.2, 2.5, and 2.6 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct all
require meaningful inquiry as “a fundamental element of
procedural justice necessary to maintain the integrity,
impartiality, and fairness of the administration of justice and the
public’s faith in it.”110
The opinion clearly states that “[a]s long as a defendant’s
failure to pay is due to genuine financial incapacity, alternatives
to incarceration must be explored.”111 Furthermore, it emphasizes
the necessity for consistently followed and “carefully prescribed
procedures” to promote uniformity—opining that failing to adopt
and adhere to such policies in failure to pay proceedings that
could result in incarceration “strikes at the very roots of the fair
and impartial administration of justice and poses a direct threat to
public faith in the legitimacy of the judicial process.”112
While some judges have been able to evade legal
accountability through the judicial immunity doctrine, this
doctrine does not shield them from ethical consequences. In
McBryde v. Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and
Disability Orders, the D.C. Circuit explained that “the
constitutional measures meant to protect judicial independence
were not intended to insulate individual judges from
accountability to ‘the world as a whole (including the judicial
branch itself),’ but ‘to safeguard the branch’s independence from
its two competitors.’”113 There is a fine line between judicial
misconduct and simple legal error.114 While the “mere legal
109. Id. at 1.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 3.
112. ABA Formal Op. 490, supra note 107 (quoting the Georgia Supreme Court’s
opinion in a judicial disciplinary case in which it recognized that for many litigants, “trial
judges ‘are the judicial system’”).
113. Cynthia Gray, The Line Between Legal Error and Judicial Misconduct: Balancing
Judicial Independence and Accountability, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1245, 1248 (2004) (citing
McBryde v. Comm. to Rev. Cir. Council Conduct & Disability Ords., 264 F.3d 52, 65 (D.C.
Cir. 2001)).
114. See generally id.
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error” rule typically shields judges from disciplinary action based
on one erroneous decision, “most cases in which judicial error [is]
elevated to the level of judicial misconduct involve[] more than
one example of legal error, and a pattern is one of the identified
exceptions to the ‘mere legal error’ rule.”115 Additionally, “[a]n
intentional failure to follow the law, even with a benign motive,
constitutes bad faith and consequently judicial misconduct.”116
While recognizing the importance of balancing the interest
of judicial independence with the need for accountability in cases
of judicial misconduct, New York’s highest court rationally
articulated that “the judiciary, the Bar, and the public are better
served when an established course of misconduct is appropriately
redressed and an unfit incumbent is removed from the Bench.”117
Judges need not concern themselves that a “mere oversight[] or
misreading[] of the law” will result in sanction for legal error.118
Instead, judges must simply “comply with clear due process
requirements and avoid bullying and patently unfair conduct.”119
The interests of judicial independence are sufficiently
safeguarded by the “mere legal error” rule, while the rule’s
exceptions make it possible “to hold judges accountable for
decisions that are clearly contrary to law, that were reached
without following the procedures that confer legitimacy and
credence upon judicial actions, that represent an exercise of
discretion motivated by bad faith, or that reflect repeated legal
error that cannot be attributed to an honest mistake.”120
One under-utilized avenue for recourse is filing a complaint
with Arkansas’s JDDC. While the Commission can choose to
open an investigation and issue punishment against any judge in
Arkansas on its own,121 the Commission’s members typically
have full-time jobs, and they cannot know what is going on in
115. Id. at 1263.
116. Id. at 1268.
117. In re Duckman, 699 N.E.2d 872, 881 (N.Y. 1998).
118. Gray, supra note 113, at 1280 (adding that judicial independence is not threatened
simply because “the possibility of discipline for legal error may induce . . . second thoughts
before judicial decision-making”).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. ARK. JUD. DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY COMM’N r. 8(A) (2013).
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every courtroom in Arkansas if they are not made aware. Because
a judge who has immunity has not been held liable in a court of
law, the ethical complaint process is a way of putting a judge “on
notice,” so to speak, for his or her bad behavior.122
In 2014, the Commission admonished a district court judge
in Craighead County for instituting an illegal fee of $35.00 that
was levied “against certain defendants, for changing a plea from
‘not guilty’ to ‘guilty.’”123 While the Letter of Admonishment
put the judge on notice, the voters had the final word when he
subsequently lost reelection in 2016.124 Complaints may be made
to the Commission anonymously or with the complainant’s name
attached,125 so attorneys, prosecutors, and public defenders who
witness unlawful behavior in the courtroom can make a report
without fear of retaliation. While anyone can make a complaint,
the average citizen is likely not aware of this avenue for recourse.
Therefore, attorneys should more frequently utilize this remedial
measure to put judges on notice, so if their behavior continues,
the punishment will further escalate.
B. Enumerating Specific Factors for Consideration in
Arkansas’s Statute
Arkansas’s applicable statute, as it stands, requires that a
judge must consider:
(A) The financial resources of the defendant and the burden
that payment of restitution will impose with regard to
another obligation of the defendant;
(B) The ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an
installment basis or on another condition to be fixed by the
court; and
(C) The rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment
of restitution and the method of payment.126

122. See id. at 8(D).
123. Press Release, supra note 54, at 1.
124. Keith Blackman, BALLOTPEDIA, [https://perma.cc/RFQ6-GUYA] (last visited
Jan. 29, 2021).
125. ARK. JUD. DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY COMM’N r. 8(A).
126. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-205(e)(2)(A)-(C) (2015).
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Currently, the statute—on its face—seems adequate. However,
as stated above, the statute’s lack of specificity leaves too much
ambiguity and room for interpretation as to what exactly is
required.127 Implementation is the issue.
The statute should instead require specific inquiries. These
requirements need not even go beyond what questions a person
would generally ask to determine someone’s net worth. The court
should first determine the individual’s anticipated monthly
income. Next, the court should establish whether the individual
has any dependents relying on their monthly income. On a similar
note, the court should ascertain the individual’s monthly living
expenses (i.e., monthly housing cost, the average cost of utilities
per month, groceries, etc.). An individual should not have to miss
a rent payment or forego running water for themselves and their
families to prioritize, for example, a speeding ticket.
Additionally, the court may inquire into whether an individual
possesses any liquid assets.
If the statute were to enumerate specific factors for review,
there would be significantly less grey area when analyzing a
person’s realistic ability to pay and on what schedule. Because
there are so many small local courts across the state of Arkansas,
it can be difficult to ensure each court is adhering to the same set
of legal procedures and upholding society’s expectation of ethics
in the judiciary. In reducing statutory ambiguity, the legislature
could positively effect change in a concrete and cognizable way.
C. Improving Record-Keeping, Transparency, and
Accountability
Another obstacle for justice—particularly in rural
communities—is the lack of adequate record-keeping.128 This is
a problem because many times, defendants “have no way to track
the total debt owed or ensure their payments are properly applied
to their outstanding debt[s].”129 And while community service is

127. See supra text accompanying notes 5-10.
128. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 3.
129. Id.
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typically a stated alternative to paying fines and fees,130 poor
record-keeping creates a possible scenario in which a person
completes their community service time, frequently taking time
away from work or other obligations to do so, only to learn later
that there is no such record of their completion of community
service, forcing them to start over.
Furthermore, community service is not a legitimate
alternative in many cases. For example, according to court filings
in Mahoney:
individuals must make arrangements with the local police or
other authorities in the town where the conviction occurred
. . . [and t]hey may be denied the opportunity to work at the
discretion of other municipal officials for any reason,
including that there is no work available that day, not enough
work available, or that no one is available to administer it.131

One plaintiff tried three times to no avail to complete community
service, and because the judge suspended his license, he had to
walk “to the police station in below-freezing weather only to be
told that it was too cold to work that day.”132 Unfortunately,
community service is not always a reliable alternative to payment.
Additionally, the Mahoney plaintiffs alleged numerous
instances in which they corresponded with the clerk of court to
make a partial payment, obtain an extension, or explain their
inability to pay, but were nonetheless arrested for failure to pay.133
When a sloppy administrative error on the part of the State can
result in jail time, an issue clearly exists. For example, the “Beebe
Department [in White County] serves a community of just 8,000
people[,]” yet over a span of two years, the judge issued “more
than 4,000 warrants for failure to pay fines . . . in the Beebe
Department alone.”134 To promote uniformity and give people
the confidence that record-keeping accurately reflects agreedupon extensions, community service, and any other relevant
130. CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, A BETTER ALTERNATIVE TO FINES AND FEES?
COMMUNITY SERVICE MANDATES IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2019),
[https://perma.cc/G8NE-A728].
131. Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, at 17-18.
132. Id. at 18.
133. Id. at 19-20.
134. Id. at 20.
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information, there must be an updated system to promote
accountability and transparency within the courts. An online
system in which individuals can check their outstanding balances,
make required payments, confirm payment due dates, track their
community service, and upload relevant financial information
would be considerably more practical than record-keeping by
hand at the courthouse.
V. HOW THE SYSTEM STAGNATES ARKANSAS’S
ECONOMY
The anti-tax lobby told voters they would get something for
nothing—the state or municipality would tighten its belt a little, it
would collect big money from low-level offenders, and everything
would be fine. This hurt not only the poor. In state after state the
dismantling of the tax base crippled public education and
damaged the futures of children across lines of income, hurting
many more children than just those who live in poverty.135
A system in which people are cyclically jailed because of
their inability to pay fines and fees is doomed to result in a netnegative economic outcome.136 While government officials often
perceive fines and fees as an attractive alternative to raising taxes,
they are less profitable than they may initially appear.
A. Cost of Arkansas’s County Jails
Pulaski County, the most populous county in the state with
nearly 400,000 residents,137 spent a staggering $27,123,125.68 on
its county jail in 2017.138 Calhoun County, the least populated
county in the state with 4,739 residents,139 spent $417,986.22 on

135. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at xvi.
136. See Carl Takei, WTF? Our Tax Dollars Are Being Spent to Jail a Vet for Being
Poor, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (May 28, 2014), [https://perma.cc/J9GN-8L9X].
137. Arkansas Counties by Population, ARK. DEMOGRAPHICS BY CUBIT,
[https://perma.cc/GRT7-PB8F] (last visited Oct. 1, 2021).
138. ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., LOCAL GOVERNMENT INMATE COST REPORT (2017),
[https://perma.cc/A98Z-EUTD].
139. Arkansas Counties by Population, supra note 137.
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a county jail that only holds twenty-two inmates.140 Washington
County, the state’s third most populous county,141 spends over
$19 million on its county jail,142 with smaller counties like
Poinsett (population 22,965)143 spending almost $1.5 million on
its county jail.144 Craighead County (population 111,231)145
spent nearly $9 million on its county jail in 2017.146 According
to the Association of Arkansas Counties’ report, the average
verified cost-per-day across the state to house one inmate is
$71.48.147
The amount of money Arkansas’s counties are expending on
jails has steadily risen over the last twenty years, with the
Sebastian County jail budget increasing by 53%, over $3 million,
from 2006 to 2019.148 When viewing these numbers, one should
consider the context that, nationally, Arkansas ranks 48th in
Public Health, 41st in Education, 43rd in Infrastructure, 48th in
Crime and Corrections, and 47th in Public Safety.149 Clearly, the
increased spending on jails is not leading to an increase in public
safety. In a 2020 report authored by Human Rights Watch, the
recommendations of how to effectively improve public safety
included investing in education to advance the quality of schools,
“stop[ping] enforcing laws in ways that effectively criminalize
people for their poverty[,]” investing in initiatives that provide
training and employment, providing “sufficient and adequate
health care,” and “[v]astly reduc[ing] pretrial incarceration so that
only those accused of serious crimes and found to pose a specific
danger to others can be held in custody.”150
Arkansas’s ranking in these indicators should be a wake-up
call that the State’s current investments are not productive. From
140. ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., supra note 138.
141. Arkansas Counties by Population, supra note 137.
142. ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., supra note 138.
143. Arkansas Counties by Population, supra note 137.
144. ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., supra note 138.
145. Arkansas Counties by Population, supra note 137.
146. ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., supra note 138.
147. Id.
148. Saccente, supra note 65.
149. Arkansas: #44 in Overall Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
[https://perma.cc/5LZ6-LV2J] (last visited Oct. 1, 2021).
150. A Roadmap for Re-imagining Public Safety in the United States, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Aug. 12, 2020, 8:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/WW2X-63CR].
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the personal narratives in this Comment, one can deduce that this
cycle of never-ending, court-imposed fines and fees only
contributes to the larger problem. The Brennan Center for Justice
has rightfully pointed out that because “the burden of fees and
fines falls largely on the poor” it is “much like a regressive tax”
with “mounting balances [that] underscore [their] finding that
fees and fines are an unreliable source of government revenue.”151
The report further notes that, “[j]ailing those unable to pay fees
and fines is especially costly—sometimes as much as 115 percent
of the amount collected—and generates no revenue[,]” pointing
out that this “practice is not just unconstitutional but also
irrational.”152
B. Fines and Fees as a Revenue Generator
Across the country, states and localities use fines and fees to
generate revenue.153 While revenue generation might sound good
in theory, an accurate cost-benefit analysis typically reveals that
fines and fees are not so profitable in reality. An in-depth study
of “the costs for state and local governments to enforce and collect
fees and fines” revealed massive waste, illustrating that “[t]he net
gain might be far less than [states] have imagined, [and] the losses
far more damaging.”154 New Mexico’s Bernalillo County is the
perfect example as it is “operat[ing] at a loss in this regard,
spending more than $1.17 per dollar it raises in revenue from fees
and fines.”155 However, the actual loss is impossible to calculate
as the study did not “take into account many of the counties’
investments in this work, like the time and staffing spent on

151. MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 5.
152. Id.
153. RON DEUTSCH & CARA LONG CORRA, FISCAL POLICY INST., FINES AND FEES:
RAISING REVENUE AT THE COMMUNITY’S EXPENSE 1 (2020), [https://perma.cc/K5Z8RX6W].
154. Lauren-Brooke Eisen & Matthew Menendez, Fees, Fines and Ability to Pay, HILL
(Feb. 10, 2020, 1:30 PM), [https://perma.cc/9TU2-CURS] (explaining how “[t]he IRS
spends one-third of a penny for every dollar that it collects in taxes[,]” while in the Texas
and New Mexico counties studied, “the governments spend more than 41 cents of every
dollar of revenue they raise to collect the fees and fines they impose in jail costs and in-court
proceedings alone”).
155. Id.
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enforcing warrants and suspending driver’s licenses for
nonpayment of debts.”156
Although I could not account for all the costs associated with
collecting fines and fees in Arkansas, I was able to determine
what percentage of each county’s revenue came from fines and
fees in 2019. Using each county’s most recent financial audit,157
I divided the county’s annual revenue generated from municipal
fines and fees by the county’s total annual revenue to determine
the percentage of total revenue generated by fines and fees for
each county. Below, Figure 1 serves as a visual illustration of my
findings.158 The x-axis lists the counties in order from least to
greatest in terms of percentage of total revenue generated through
fines and fees in the county.

Percentage of County's Revenue

Figure 1: Percentage of Arkansas Counties'
Revenues Generated from Fines & Fees
25.0%
20.0%
15.0%
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0.0%
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73

Arkansas's 75 Counties

156. Id.
157. County audits for each fiscal year can be accessed on the Arkansas’s Legislative
Audit website. See Search Audits, ARK. LEGIS. AUDIT, [https://perma.cc/DLB3-GGDC]
(last visited Sept. 26, 2021).
158. In addition to being available by search of the 2019 audits on the Arkansas Audit
website, the documents, as well as excel sheets supporting the findings depicted on Figure 1
are on file with the author.
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As Figure 1 demonstrates, the rate at which counties are
depending on revenue from fines and fees varies. In larger
counties, the percentage is lower because of the high rate of
property tax revenue. However, when federal aid and state aid
are not accounted for as “revenues,” the percentage grows
significantly in some counties. Additionally, a conflict of interest
arises when counties project an anticipated amount of revenue in
this category. When an amount is projected in the county’s
budget and is considered unearned revenue, law enforcement
officers, prosecutors, and judges alike are put into situations
where their interest in accruing that unearned revenue can conflict
with an equal and impartial application of the law.159
Anne Kim, Vice President of Domestic Policy at the
Progressive Policy Institute,160 explains in her piece for
Governing that “[b]ecause the burden of these penalties falls
disproportionately on people who can’t afford to pay,
jurisdictions collect far less than expected and waste resources
chasing down payments that won’t materialize.”161 Further, “as
many as one-fourth of local inmates were in jail for nonpayment
of fines and fees” in some jurisdictions, and “[i]n addition to its
direct expenses, incarceration—even short stints in jail—can lead
to costly outcomes, including unemployment, dependence on
public benefits and greater risk of crime.”162 Because these
revenues come at such a high cost both financially and socially,163
each county should work to decrease its reliance on this revenue
159. See Fines, Fees, and Financial Burdens, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION,
[https://perma.cc/2E2F-RHHC] (last visited Apr. 3, 2021) (explaining that many places use
fines and fees to fund court systems and local governments creating an inherent conflict of
interest); see, e.g., Matt Ford, The Problem With Funding Government Through Fines,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 2, 2015), [https://perma.cc/M2TK-UTQC] (discussing an issue that arose
in Nevada when tickets and fines revenue fell short of what the state legislature projected in
its two-year budget, resulting in shortfalls of $700,000 in year one and $1.4 million in year
two).
160. Anne Kim: Columnist, GOVERNING, [https://perma.cc/3MBZ-2NEW] (last visited
Apr. 20, 2021).
161. Anne Kim, When Cities Rely on Fines and Fees, Everybody Loses, GOVERNING
(Aug. 22, 2018), [https://perma.cc/K4SD-CCUE].
162. Id.
163. See id. (referencing “[a] 2014 study of Alabama court costs” which found that
“collection rates [were] under 10 percent on average—despite countless hours spent by staff
pursuing payment”).
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source. In doing so, counties could stop wasting money on fine
collection efforts and incarcerating people who cannot afford to
pay, allowing the citizens of Arkansas to put their money back
into our state’s economy instead of dragging around the ball and
chain of legal financial obligations for weeks, months, or in many
cases, years.
VI. CONCLUSION
Lawsuits have forced debtors’ prisons out of business in
increasing numbers, mostly in specific counties and
municipalities, but there are more venues to be tackled.164
Even though the United States Supreme Court, state
legislatures, and the vast majority of legal scholars are in
agreement that debtors’ prisons are both unethical and
unconstitutional, people in Arkansas and across America are still
jailed every day simply because they cannot pay the legal
financial burdens that they face. Regardless of statutes and case
law that seemingly ban this practice, it is clear that these
safeguards have fallen far short of ensuring poverty is not
criminalized.
Whether or not one may personally empathize with the
victims of this system, it is in everyone’s best interest to reform
it. Not only does jailing poor people have no positive impact on
their ability to pay their legal financial obligations, but it also
almost always has the opposite effect—frequently leading to
unemployment, additional debt, and less money circulating in our
economy to support Arkansas’s businesses. The State itself
would benefit from reforming this system too. As it stands now,
the system of fines and fees collections is a drain on taxpayer
dollars, does not effectively reduce or deter crime, and stagnates
our state’s economy.

164. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 28.

